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The Conservation Policy Community 
in Papua New Guinea 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A good deal has been written about the ways in which the members of local or indigenous 
communities in Papua New Guinea perceive and act upon their ‘natural environment’.  This 
literature has more recently been supplemented by studies of their interaction with ‘conservation 
projects’ that have to be designed around the abiding prevalence of ‘custom’ in determining the 
ownership and use of natural resources.  Less attention has been paid to the historical formation 
and internal constitution of the ‘conservation policy community’ which has developed in the face of 
this natural and institutional landscape.  The question addressed in this paper is whether the social 
contours of this policy community have primarily been shaped by the global political economy of 
conservation, or whether it has peculiar national characteristics that can only be explained by the 
political and economic history of PNG, or by the pattern of biological and cultural diversity for 
which the country is notorious. 
Introduction 
 
Anthropologists get rather annoyed when conservationists use romanticised images of indigenous 
peoples living in harmony with Mother Nature in order to attract the funding required to 
implement biodiversity conservation projects in wild and woolly places.  One source of their 
annoyance might be the fact that their own standards of social realism and ‘good practice’ have 
caused them to forsake the same strategy as a device for funding their own research, except perhaps 
in those few cases where funding is dedicated to ‘urgent’ research on ‘disappearing’ or ‘endangered’ 
peoples.  When anthropologists encounter conservation projects ‘in the field’, their first inclination 
is still to explore the discrepancy between the representations of local or indigenous communities 
which the conservationists are reproducing on a daily basis, and the ‘realities’ of local or indigenous 
social life which the anthropologist alone is privileged to behold.  Anthropologists with a taste for 
irony are likely to focus particular attention on that slice of social reality which is made up of local 
perceptions of conservation and conservationists, especially when these diverge from the self-
representations of the conservation practitioners.  From this point of view, the anthropology of 
conservation is simply one species of the genus generally known as the anthropology of 
‘development’, because it deals with the mutual misunderstandings that arise from encounters 
between local (or traditional) communities and global (or modern) organisations in relatively 
backward corners of the globe.   
 
In this paper, I propose to take a rather different tack, by putting aside the question of what is or is 
not an accurate representation of the way that local or indigenous people ‘really’ relate to their 
natural environment, or what they ‘really’ think about the biodiversity conservation business, or 
how they actually interact with conservationists.  These are no doubt very interesting questions, but 
they tend to obscure another set of questions about the way that people involved in this business 
relate to each other, or to their institutional environment, within the local, national and global 
domains of conservation policy.  Anthropologists can also help to address these other questions by 
virtue of their ethnographic understanding of the conservation policy process as a social process in its 
own right.  Interactions between conservation practitioners and local communities are one part of 
this process, as are various representations of ‘traditional ecological knowledge’, but they do not 
constitute the whole of the policy process at any level of social or political organisation – least of all 
the national level. 
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My own interest in the workings of the conservation policy community in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) springs in part from a set of gut feelings about my own position in three different national 
policy domains.  I feel quite certain of my membership in a policy community that shares a 
common interest in the biodiversity conservation business.  I think I also qualify as a member of 
another national policy community that shares a common interest in the development of large-scale 
mining and petroleum projects, but membership of this mineral policy community has a very 
different feel to it.  I also think that I am a longstanding participant in the national forest policy 
process, but I do not think there is a national forest policy community.  Instead, I would say that the 
conservation policy community is a collective player in this forest policy process, and its sense of 
collective identity is partly derived from this fact, but it also has a common enemy, which is the 
large-scale logging industry, and the struggle between the two sides is both the central feature of the 
process and the reason why it does not have a unique policy community attached to it. 
The second reason for my interest in the formation of national policy communities is the fact that 
family circumstances have prevented me from spending more than a week away from home for 
more than a decade.  This means that I have not been able to make first-hand observations of the 
way that local communities interact with conservation practitioners or any other species of external 
agent since 1995 (Filer 2004a).  Instead, most of my business travels have taken me to meetings 
about matters of national or international policy in one or other of the three domains which I have 
just outlined.  Some of my colleagues might say that I have therefore ceased to be a proper 
anthropologist and have become some sort of policy wonk.  But what I find to be more interesting, 
from an ethnographic point of view, is the way in which my movement from Port Moresby to 
Canberra, midway though the last decade, has affected my understanding of the way that national 
policy communities are connected to global policy regimes.   
 
Although there are many anthropologists who now recognise that ‘policy’ is a subject fit for 
ethnographic study at different levels of social and political organisation, there are very few who 
seem to think that policy communities are either substantial or interesting in their own right.  For 
example, in their introduction to a volume on the anthropology of policy, Shore and Wright remark 
that ‘a focus on policy provides a new avenue for studying the localisation of global process in the 
contemporary world’ (Shore and Wright 1997: 13), but they keep their single mention of ‘policy 
communities’ bracketed by inverted commas, apparently to stress the point that such communities 
are ‘not just rhetorical, but contested political spaces’ (ibid: 15).  There is now a substantial body of 
literature on the representation and engagement of local communities in ‘community-based’ 
conservation projects, which generally shows that these are also rhetorical yet contested political 
spaces (e.g. Brosius et al. 1998; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Leach et al. 1999), but does not 
countenance the possibility that there are conservation policy communities at work behind such 
projects.  And in their recent study of the relationship between environmental science and 
conservation policy at different levels of political organisation, Fairhead and Leach make passing 
mention of the role played by national scientific and policy communities, without inverted commas, 
but without further elaboration of their significance as ‘communities’ (Fairhead and Leach 2003: 
230). 
 
What might explain this apparent lack of enthusiasm for an ethnographic study of policy 
communities?  One argument would be that anthropologists are known to specialise in the study of 
local communities, and if they want their voices to be heard by a wider public, including people who 
make policies, they had best stick to their guns.  Another argument would be that policy 
communities, like policy networks, are metaphors invented by an old-fashioned bunch of political 
scientists in an effort to explain how real-world policies are made or changed, and have not actually 
served this purpose (Dowding 1995).  A parallel argument would say that metaphors of this kind 
are simply part of the wider discourse of policy, or discourse of development, whose 
deconstruction is the task that best suits the discipline of anthropology (Apthorpe and Gasper 
1996; Grillo and Stirrat 1997; Keeley and Scoones 1999).  For some anthropologists, this means 
that the world of policy is a world from which they must stand apart in order to read it as a set of 
hegemonic text messages (Escobar 1991; Zerner 1996).  Yet Raymond Apthorpe, who is one of the 
pioneers of this approach (Apthorpe 1986), has shown that it is quite possible for anthropologists 
to get down and dirty in the real world of policy, even while they let off intellectual steam in each 
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other’s company.  So the question then is whether their participant observation of a specific type of 
policy process in a specific political setting might cause them to invoke the concept of a policy 
community to describe what is happening or what they are doing.  
 
I have already suggested that policy communities are contingent features of the political landscape, 
and for that very reason, it is worth our while to ask how and why they appear, persist, or vanish 
within specific policy domains.  This question can be framed by reference to some of the other 
predicates that make up the world of policy.  Starting from the top, we can first make a distinction 
between global policy regimes, which are normally defined by reference to international conventions, 
and national or sub-national policy regimes, which are defined by reference to legislation.  For the 
sake of argument, we can say that each policy regime at any level of political organisation is both 
the cause and the consequence of a specific policy process.  Each policy process applies to the set of 
issues that constitute a specific policy domain but can also transform the boundaries of that domain.  
For each policy process, there will normally be a policy network connecting the actors who have 
some influence over its direction or outcome.  Some, though not all, of these actors will normally 
be government officials whose positions are formally linked to specific policy regimes.  Some, 
though not all, of these actors may count as policy brokers, because their inclusion in more than one 
policy network enables them to make connections between policy processes relating to the same 
policy domain at different levels of political organisation or different policy domains at the same 
level of political organisation. 
 
All these definitions are broadly consistent with the current terminologies of political science.  My 
definition of a policy community is that offered by Coleman and Perl (1999), when they suggest it is a 
type of policy network which manifests a certain degree of social integration or closure.  This in 
turn is indicated by the existence of ‘boundary rules’ that determine membership of the community, 
and by a shared set of ‘beliefs, values and norms’ which anthropologists might choose to describe 
as a common ‘culture’.  The same authors suggest that policy communities are a feature of relatively 
stable policy domains, but each is liable to turn back into a policy network when the relevant policy 
process becomes too controversial or chaotic.  To this I would add the suggestion that policy 
communities tend to develop within the confines of a specific policy regime or through the vertical 
integration of global and sub-global policy regimes in the same policy domain.  This seems to be 
related to another point made by Coleman and Perl, when they say that members of an ‘epistemic 
community’, which is a transnational community of experts, may function as policy brokers who 
link the members of different national policy communities to form a single transnational policy 
community within a given policy domain. 
 
So much for definitions.  I should now stress that my aim in this paper is not to test the usefulness 
of the policy community concept in explaining how national conservation policies are made, 
revised, or implemented, or whether they succeed or fail.  My aims are more modest.  First, I want 
to see how this concept can help to fill a gap which other anthropologists have described in 
somewhat different terms.  For example, Brosius (1999) bemoans the lack of ethnographic 
attention to the environmental component of what he calls ‘national political cultures’, and this is 
similar to what I mean by the national conservation policy process.  Second, I share an interest 
expressed by Brosius in the same article, where he wonders what influence we anthropologists 
might exercise in the conservation policy process of a country that is not our own by birth or even 
residence.  And finally, I wonder whether the social contours of the conservation policy community 
in PNG have primarily been shaped by the global political economy of conservation, or whether it 
has peculiar national characteristics that can only be explained by the country’s political and 
economic history, or by the pattern of biological and cultural diversity for which the country is 
notorious. 
 
I have previously described PNG’s conservation policy process as an ‘unpredictable, disputed, 
open-ended’ process in order to indicate my belief that it is not just the national consequence of a 
global policy regime which tells the actors what they have to do (Filer 2004a: 83-4).  In that analysis, 
however, I simplified my description of the national conservation policy community to the point of 
caricature, by describing it as a body split between Western and Melanesian conservationists, with a 
  
4
separate role assigned to Western anthropologists like myself.  That is because my main concern in 
that paper was to explore the ways in which each of these three groups of people speak to or about 
those indigenous people or customary landowners whose collaboration is required for the success 
of ‘community-based’ conservation projects.  By implication, these local people are outside the 
bubble of the national conservation policy community because they do not play an active role in the 
national conservation policy process.  Now that I have shifted my attention to the shape and size of 
the bubble itself, I must also abandon the implication that national or racial identities, or the 
subordinate contrast between anthropologists and (other) conservationists, will suffice to explain 
the diversity of roles and characters contained within it.   
 
The Making of a Policy Community 
 
The common interest that binds the current membership of PNG’s conservation policy community 
may be traced to one global policy regime − the Convention on Biological Diversity.  In very crude 
terms, this partly explains why the members understand ‘conservation’ to mean the conservation of 
‘nature’, or ‘nature-plus-culture’, but not the conservation of ‘culture’ without ‘nature’.  The PNG 
Government ratified this convention in 1993, and the Conservation Division of the Department of 
Environment and Conservation has been responsible for dealing with the consequences ever since.  
The professional staff of this agency therefore count as members of the national conservation 
policy community.  However, ratification of the convention was only one moment in a 
conservation policy process that was already under way, and does not suffice to explain its 
subsequent development. 
 
If we adopt a somewhat broader concept of what counts as a global policy regime, we could say 
that the real turning point in the national policy process was the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 and all 
the agreements and institutions that flowed from it (Berkhout et al. 2003).  Even so, the national 
impact of this global policy process has been conditioned by the fact that PNG is a country full of 
tropical forests and the sort of biodiversity values that are associated with them.  The membership 
of PNG’s conservation policy community has therefore come to include some of the members of 
the transnational epistemic community which Fairhead and Leach (2003) call the ‘Tropical Forest 
International’.  But the problem of tropical forest management had been a significant issue in 
PNG’s conservation policy process for at least 20 years before the Rio Earth Summit, and for most 
of that period, I would hesitate to describe any of the key players as transnational policy brokers or 
to ascribe their influence to any global forest policy regime. 
 
It is hard for me to describe the origins of PNG’s conservation policy community because I have 
no claim to be a founding member.  It might be argued that a national policy community of any kind 
can only be formed in the wake of national political autonomy or independence, in which case, this 
particular community would have emerged in the period following self-government in 1973.  There 
is no doubt that the people involved in making all sorts of policies for the new state did have a 
strong sense of collective purpose and identity (Ballard 1981), but it is not so clear that they were 
divided into a number of discrete policy communities.  According to Parker (1978), a new recipe for 
the practice of ‘wildlife management’ was indeed formulated in the mid-seventies, and like other 
sectoral policy innovations of the time, it consisted in an eight-point plan that was meant to be 
consistent with the goals and directives of the Constitution.  The fourth National Goal, which calls 
for the conservation of ‘natural resources and environment’, can and has been taken as a charter for 
the national conservation policy process that predates the Convention on Biological Diversity by 17 
years.  However, this was not accompanied by any major change in the legislation pertaining to 
nature conservation.   
 
The Fauna Protection Ordinance and the National Parks Ordinance were both originally gazetted in 1966, 
and the first of these was amended in 1974 to allow for customary landowners to establish Wildlife 
Management Areas on their own land.  The Conservation Areas Act of 1978 made allowance for 
greater government control of protected areas established at the request of customary landowners, 
but was not brought into effect.  Another law was passed in 1979 in order for the Government to 
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comply with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.  Despite the later 
ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity, this body of legislation, with a number of 
minor amendments, has continued to function as the legal basis for the national conservation policy 
regime.  It cannot therefore tell us very much about the origin and evolution of the policy 
community associated with it. 
 
A better insight into the composition of the conservation policy network or community in the years 
preceding and following national independence may be gained from the proceedings of a number 
of regional or national conferences held during that period (Costin and Groves 1973; McAlpine 
1975; Lamb and Gressitt 1976; Winslow 1977; Morauta et al. 1982).  From reading this material, 
one has the impression that the core of this network or community was originally a collection of 
white scientists, including some anthropologists, whose expert knowledge enabled them to drive the 
bureaucratic and educational agenda within the conservation policy process.  With the advent of 
self-government, they were looking to recruit additional players from the ranks of a nascent 
national intelligentsia with a very high level of occupational mobility, a small minority of whom had 
jobs in the Office of Environment and Conservation.  As time went by, they also displayed a 
growing interest in the possible application of traditional ecological knowledge to national 
conservation policy, and for this reason, there is no clear division between the voice of the national 
intelligentsia and that of the customary landowner.  But even in this early period, the 
anthropologists were sounding rather sceptical about the application (Bulmer 1982; Carrier 1982; 
Dwyer 1982). 
 
If a conservation policy community existed in the 1970s, then one of its cardinal values was open 
hostility to the large-scale logging industry (McAlpine 1975; Routley and Routley 1977; Waiko 1977; 
De’Ath 1980).  In this respect, little has changed in the last 30 years.  What has changed is the 
organisational form of this opposition, because the conservation policy community that now 
participates in the forest policy process appears to be led by a group of non-government 
organisations rather than a group of scientists employed by research institutions.  This apparent 
change in the composition of the policy community can be traced back to the scandals that 
provoked a public inquiry into forest industry corruption in the late 1980s (Barnett 1989, 1992).  
The Government’s response was to initiate a new forest policy process that led to the establishment 
of a new forest policy regime, legally embodied in the Forestry Act of 1992, but the process included 
a request for international assistance under the Tropical Forestry Action Plan.  As a result, the 
World Bank organised an ‘inter-agency review mission’ whose report (World Bank 1990) laid the 
foundation for a National Forestry Action Plan that was endorsed by a ‘round table’ of national and 
international stakeholders in 1990.   
 
It was this event, more than any other, which served to crystallise the structure of the national 
conservation policy community, despite the fact that it was not initially conceived as part of a 
distinctive conservation policy process.  There are several reasons for this.  First, the inter-agency 
review mission included a representative of one international NGO, the London-based 
International Institute for Environment and Development, who made it her business to encourage 
the formation of a National Alliance of Non-Government Organisations that would claim and 
receive official recognition in the National Forestry Action Plan.  Although some members of this 
national NGO ‘community’ were deeply suspicious of the World Bank’s agenda (Brunton 1990), 
many of them turned up to the round table and lobbied successfully, with one voice, for an 
immediate greening of the plan put forward by the Government (Filer 1991).  Some of the 
government officials at the meeting, and not just those from the Department of Environment and 
Conservation, were also keen to push the plan in this direction, even if they were less vociferous.  
Representatives of the ‘donor community’, including the World Bank, adopted their usual masks of 
diplomatic caution.  However, the looming prospect of the Rio Earth Summit certainly made them 
amenable to the proposal that later emerged from the national Steering Committee and its 
Technical Support Team, which was to change the name of the plan to the National Forestry and 
Conservation Action Program (Filer 1998). 
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The structure of the national conservation policy community was consolidated, as its membership 
also expanded, through the design and implementation of a number of donor-funded projects that 
were part of this action program.  This was initially evident in the composition and deliberations of 
the Steering Committee and the Technical Support Team, both of which made space for 
representatives of the national NGO community (Mayers and Peutalo 1995).  One of the reasons 
why the PNG Government was quick to ratify the Convention on Biological Diversity was because 
the World Bank had dangled the prospect of a US$5 million grant from the Global Environment 
Facility for a project which came to be known as the Biodiversity Conservation and Resource 
Management Program (BCRMP).  This was ‘implemented’ by the UN Development Program, and 
‘executed’ by the Department of Environment and Conservation, over a five-year period from 1993 
to 1998.  Its primary mandate was to undertake two experimental integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs) in different parts of the country and apply the lessons learned from 
these experiments to the development of a new national conservation policy regime (McCallum and 
Sekhran 1997; Ellis 1997; van Helden 1998, 2001; Filer 2004a).  In practice, this entailed an effort to 
integrate and coordinate the national conservation policy community, and to forge new links 
between its members and the transnational epistemic community that was already gathered around 
the Biodiversity Convention. 
 
These efforts are clearly documented in the report presented to the PNG Biodiversity Country 
Study Workshop held at the Christensen Research Institute near Madang in 1994 (Sekhran and 
Miller 1994).  This explains that the report and the workshop were both steps in a policy process 
recommended by the international Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Biological 
Diversity, through which signatories to the Biodiversity Convention would be able to meet their 
obligation to produce a Strategic Framework for conservation in their respective jurisdictions.  The 
report also notes that an earlier step in this process had already been taken by a USAID-funded 
Conservation Needs Assessment workshop held at the same location in 1992 (Alcorn and Beehler 
1993).  The identities and roles of the people contributing to both workshops and reports provide a 
fair indication of how the ‘expert’ element of the conservation policy community was taking shape 
under the aegis of the Biodiversity Convention.  This portrait can then be supplemented by the 
proceedings of two more workshops sponsored by the BCRMP, both of which were meant to 
reflect the experience of ‘conservation practitioners’ responsible for the design and implementation 
of conservation projects in different parts of the country (James 1996; Saulei and Ellis 1998). 
Aside from the two experimental ICDPs initiated and managed directly by the BCRMP, there were 
eight other initiatives which BCRMP staff recognised as ‘ICAD’ projects when the second of these 
meetings was held in 1997.  All of them had been initiated in the period since 1989, all had a 
measure of support from foreign funding agencies, and all involved some measure of engagement 
by national or international environmental NGOs (Filer 1998).  However, they varied a good deal 
both in scale and complexity.  The scale of each project could be measured by the number of 
people employed to work on it at any one time, the size of the area which they were seeking to 
conserve, or the numbers of customary landowners with whom they had to negotiate.  The 
complexity of each project was a function of the number of organisations or individuals who were 
supporting it in some way, even if they had no physical presence in PNG or in the local area. 
The standard pattern which had developed by this time was one in which a big international NGO 
gathered money from one or more foreign sources and either shared a proportion of this money 
with a small local NGO or helped a small local NGO to get some foreign money of its own so that 
they could work together on a specific conservation project.  For example, the Worldwide Fund for 
Nature entered into a partnership with the Village Development Trust, the Wildlife Conservation 
Society with the Research and Conservation Foundation, Conservation International with the Wau 
Ecology Institute, and Greenpeace with Conservation Melanesia.  There were some variations on 
this pattern, but the BINGO-SLONGO relationship, as I shall call it here, was already a significant 
structural feature of the conservation policy community.  It was also a source of tension and 
conflict because of the amounts of money which had been made available for conservation projects 
since the National Forestry and Conservation Action Program had taken shape.  However, the 
point at issue was not just the division of money and labour between BINGOs and SLONGOs in 
the design and implementation of conservation projects, but also the division between what I have 
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previously called the radical and pragmatic wings of the NGO community within the conservation 
policy community (Filer 1998). 
 
Oddly enough, this second division came to a head in the second of the experimental ICDPs 
initiated by the BCRMP, which was known as the Bismarck-Ramu Project.  The design of this 
project led to the creation of a new SLONGO known as the Bismarck-Ramu Group, whose 
members then decided that anything known as a ‘project’ had no chance of delivering conservation 
outcomes because it would simply have the effect of turning customary landowners into rent-
seekers and opportunists (van Helden 1998, 2001; Filer 2004a).  The pragmatic wing of the 
conservation policy community then came to be identified with the idea that donor-funded 
‘projects’ were the best or only way to establish protected areas, whereas the radical wing came to 
be identified with the idea that the best or only way to achieve any kind of conservation was to 
mobilise popular opposition to the concept and practice of ‘development’ -- including the 
developmental component of ICDPs.   
 
The Bismarck-Ramu Group still exists, but the Bismarck-Ramu Project came to an end when the 
BCRMP failed to secure a second phase of funding from the Global Environment Facility.  The 
fashion for ICDPs has passed its peak within the global conservation policy community (Brandon 
et al. 1998; Terborgh 1999), but they are still being designed, funded and implemented in many 
developing countries, including PNG, even if more of them are now known as ‘community-based 
conservation projects’.  One of the last acts of the BCRMP was to initiate a design process which 
eventually led the Global Environment Facility to fund a community-based marine conservation 
project in PNG, which is once again being implemented by the UN Development Program, but this 
time being executed by a BINGO, Conservation International, rather than the PNG Department of 
Environment and Conservation (van Helden 2004).  In the meantime, World Bank staff have spent 
an enormous amount of time negotiating the terms of a Forestry and Conservation Project with the 
PNG Government, and if this project were ever to be implemented, which now seems unlikely, it 
would include another grant from the Global Environment Facility to an entity known as the Mama 
Graun [‘Mother Earth’] Trust Fund (Filer 2000).  I might now go on to describe how the 
negotiation of these two projects has changed the shape of the national conservation policy 
community over the last seven years.  But rather than persist in the same vein, I want to take a 
closer look at the question of how ‘we’ members know that we belong to it and what the members 
think about each other. 
 
Knowing One’s Place in the Space 
 
My own initiation into the national conservation policy community dates back to the round table 
meeting of 1990.  I and a couple of colleagues from the University of PNG invited ourselves to that 
meeting as ‘observers’, and later secured a position for the national research ‘community’ on the 
Steering Committee of the National Forestry Action Plan.  We also secured a position within the 
Task Force on Environmental Planning in Priority Forest Areas, which was established as the first 
‘project’ under the Action Plan in order to meet the demands made by the national NGO 
‘community’ (Filer 1991).  Having occupied both of these positions, I then became embroiled in the 
design and implementation of several other projects under the National Forestry and Conservation 
Action Program and its offshoot, the Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management 
Program.  I wrote a chapter on ‘The Nature of the Human Threat’ for the Biodiversity Country 
Study (Filer 1994), and facilitated the deliberations of the Socio-Economic Group at the Country 
Study Workshop.  Having left the University of PNG to join the National Research Institute, I took 
responsibility for another country study, commissioned by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development, on ‘Policy That Works for Forests and People’ (Filer 1997 (ed.), 
1998).  While working on that study, I also had oversight of Flip van Helden’s ‘Social Feasibility 
Study’ of the Bismarck-Ramu Project (van Helden 1998) and hosted the PNG component of an 
international research program on ‘The Future of the Tropical Forest Peoples’ funded by the 
European Commission (http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/Rainforest). 
 
  
8
If I was still a member of PNG’s conservation policy community when I left the National Research 
Institute at the end of 2000, what makes me feel that I am still a member today, when I am no 
longer living in the country or being paid by its government?  First of all, there are the projects.  My 
part of the Australian National University has a contract with Conservation International to 
implement something known as the ‘Small Islands in Peril Program’ as part of the Milne Bay 
Community-Based Coastal and Marine Conservation Project.  Our input to this project is also part 
of a sub-global assessment of coastal and marine ecosystems in PNG within the framework of the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (www.maweb.org), and as members of the Sub-Global Working 
Group, we are also members of the transnational epistemic community whose membership has 
been established by means of this global process.  The conceptual framework of the Millennium 
Assessment is also informing a separate study of the poverty-environment relationship in PNG that 
we are conducting in partnership with the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF).   
 
However, projects of this type are only one manifestation of a deeper and wider network of 
relationships and communications in which my feeling of membership is articulated.  Take my 
dealings with WWF, for example.  I have been a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee of 
WWF Australia for the last two years, but this does not make me feel like a member of Australia’s 
conservation policy community, nor would I even venture to guess whether such a thing exists in a 
form that fits my definition.  My role on this committee is to advise the Australian branch of the 
organisation on its own dealings with the South Pacific Program of WWF International, which is 
the part that operates in PNG.  I was invited to join the committee on the recommendation of 
someone who has worked for the South Pacific Program for long enough to have been a member 
of the Socio-Economic Group at PNG’s Biodiversity Country Study Workshop back in 1994.  
While this person functions as our principal partner in the conduct of the poverty-environment 
study, the partnership also includes an official in the Australian Department of Environment and 
Heritage who is responsible for building relationships with the PNG Department of Environment 
and Conservation.  The triangular relationship between myself and these two other characters is by 
no means confined to the conduct of the poverty-environment study, but extends to discussion of a 
range of policy options and possible ‘projects’ that involve other government agencies on both 
sides of the border, as well as other members of the NGO community in PNG.   
 
The substance of these discussions is rarely put into writing, and the effect is rather hard to judge, 
because the inter-governmental element is tied up with the long strings of diplomacy.  Another way 
for me to test my feeling of membership in the policy community is to sample the contents of my 
physical and electronic mailbox.  For the last six years, I have been on the mailing list for Iko-Forestri 
Nius, ‘The Quarterly Eco-Forestry Newsletter for Papua New Guinea’, which has been published 
by a SLONGO known as The Eco-Forestry Forum with funds supplied by the (American) 
Macarthur Foundation and the (Dutch) Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation.  I 
would not claim that my automatic inclusion in such a mailing list counts as a membership card, nor 
is there any mention of me or my activities within the pages of the newsletter itself, but it does 
contain a wealth of information about the activities of other individuals within the non-
governmental section of the community, and I can therefore gauge my own position in terms of my 
relationship with each of these people.   
 
While Iko-Forestri Nius serves to celebrate the work of some members of the conservation policy 
community, it also deplores the machinations of the large-scale logging industry.  The second of 
these functions has been taken to a scandalous extreme in an electronic newsletter circulated by a 
mole whose cyber-name is Masalai i Tokaut – a name which I translate as ‘Grumbling Bush Spirit’ 
(see www.masalai-i-tokaut.com).  I say this spirit is a ‘mole’ because it has been able to access and 
reproduce a number of confidential government documents, and this no doubt explains its need for 
anonymity.  So far as I can tell, people like myself, who have been on the receiving end of these 
broadcasts since they started in the middle of 2002, are those whom the spirit deems to be fellow 
travellers in the conservation policy community, whereas those whose names are mentioned in 
despatches are thereby cast as members of the enemy camp.  One of the people who falls into this 
second category is the Secretary for Environment and Conservation, mainly because of what he has 
or has not done in his capacity as Chairman of the National Forest Board.  Since he is head of the 
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government agency that is formally responsible for the implementation of national conservation 
policy, this raises an awkward question about the outer limits of membership in the ‘policy 
community’. 
 
This question leads me to another part of my electronic mailbox, which consists of email messages 
between people who clearly do regard each other as members of this community.  The example I 
cite here is one that reflects on the passage of amendments to the Forestry Act in August 2005, 
which had the effect of removing the Chairman of The Eco-Forestry Forum from the National 
Forest Board, where he had been representing the NGO community, and including a representative 
of the Forest Industries Association, whose members are the large-scale logging companies.  One 
of the participants in this exchange was one of two MPs who voted against the amendments.  This 
man is familiar to other members of the conservation policy community because he was the 
founder of a SLONGO that specialises in the practice of eco-forestry, was appointed as Minister 
for Environment and Conservation after his election to Parliament in 2002, but was later dismissed 
from this office after he fell out with the aforementioned Secretary.  But the main point of interest 
here is the list of other people who either contributed to the exchange or received copies of it.  Two 
of them are people whom I do not recognise from their email addresses, but seem to be Papua 
New Guineans resident in Australia and the UK respectively.  One is the Papua New Guinean 
policy officer employed by The Eco-Forestry Forum.  One is a Papua New Guinean lawyer who 
has a record of helping local landowners to sue logging companies.  There are two expatriate 
foresters, one Australian and one new Zealander, who have both been engaged with PNG’s forest 
policy process for longer than I have, and both of whom were most recently members of the 
Independent Forestry Review Team established at the behest of the World Bank during the period 
of negotiation over the ill-fated Forestry and Conservation Project.  There is a World Bank staff 
member who is unknown to me, but presumably retains a residual interest in the fate of this 
project.  There is a fellow Englishman who worked for many years in the PNG Prime Minister’s 
Department but now works for the European Union in the Solomon Islands.  And finally, there is 
another New Zealander who has taken over the Englishman’s role in the Prime Minister’s 
Department, having previously worked in PNG’s National Forest Service and then as a consultant 
to the World Bank. 
 
I would not have been copied in on this exchange if I had not already been in communication with 
the Australian forester on a related matter of mutual interest.  For this reason, I would not currently 
claim to occupy as central a position in either the forest policy process or the conservation policy 
community as some of the other people in the list.  On the other hand, I have known some of them 
for as long as I have been involved in either of these things, and that is what makes me wonder 
how we move around within this semi-structured space, and how we enter it or leave it.  This 
particular snatch of electronic communication tells us that the boundaries of the national policy 
community are not ‘national’ boundaries in any simple sense of the word, nor do they encompass a 
set of ‘stakeholders’ whose interests and actions are a function of their duty statements or terms of 
reference.  This is not a world-shattering revelation.  But then we must ask how the criteria of 
community membership are related to what the members actually do, including what they do when 
they seek to exclude other people from the privilege of membership. 
 
Some years ago, when I must have occupied a more central position in the conservation policy 
community, I was asked to chair the selection panel for positions on the board of the Mama Graun 
Trust Fund.  After a long debate, the panel proposed that one of these positions should be 
occupied by the Executive Officer of the Forest Industries Association in order to give the logging 
industry some sense of corporate responsibility for the success of the conservation business.  The 
panel’s recommendations were duly sent to people in The Nature Conservancy and the World Bank 
who were responsible for the organisation of the whole enterprise, and this particular 
recommendation was rejected.  I do not know who made this decision, but it was clearly one of the 
moments at which the exclusion of PNG’s logging industry from the conservation policy 
community was declared to be a moral necessity.  This alerts us to the existence of a well-guarded 
fence or pale within the forest policy process, where community members stake their views on who 
can be admitted or who should be expelled.  As we have seen, the focal point of this contest is not 
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the board of the Mama Graun Trust Fund but the National Forest Board.  Some members, 
including myself, would say that it makes no sense to exclude the Secretary for Environment and 
Conservation, even if it makes sense to exclude any representative of the Forest Industries 
Association.  Others, like the Grumbling Bush Spirit, would still put him beyond the pale.  The 
community is not defined by its agreement on this score, but by the fact that members have strong 
opinions. 
 
However, if we move to other sections of the perimeter, this no longer seems to be the case.  When 
I turned up at a youth hostel in Brussels for a meeting about the future of the ‘The Future of the 
Tropical Forest Peoples’ program, I found that all the participants had been given colour-coded 
name tags, and when I asked why my own name tag had such an uncommon colour, I was told that 
this signified my role as a ‘gatekeeper’.  The gate I was keeping, in this instance, was the one 
through which foreign scientists gain access to ‘the field’ in PNG.  One of my jobs as a staff 
member of the National Research Institute was to manage the process through which they sought 
provincial government approval for their research plans.  Some of the scientists who passed 
through this gate were anthropologists and biologists, some of whom were proposing to conduct 
research on the people, plants or animals associated with conservation projects, and some of whom 
might like to claim membership of the national conservation policy community.  Some resident 
members were not very happy about the fact that an anthropologist was organising entry tickets for 
biologists.  More serious was their concern about the protection of indigenous intellectual property 
in accordance with Article 8 of the Biodiversity Convention (Whimp and Busse 2000).  But even if 
someone in my former position were able to develop a set of protocols for the early detection and 
exclusion of intellectual property thieves, this would still not count as a method of adjudicating 
claims to membership of a policy community. 
 
Since I am not a citizen of PNG, my own positions within the national policy community could 
never be described as positions of leadership.  If the community does have national leaders, they 
might surely be the people with more power to decide who does or does not count as a member.  
But who counts as a leader?  Some members might nominate the erstwhile Minister for 
Environment and Conservation who voted against the amendments to the Forestry Act, but he is not 
the leader of a Green Party in Parliament, for there is no such thing.  My vote (if I had one) would 
go to a lawyer who presently works for an international organisation in Washington, but has 
certainly been a key member of the policy community for the last 20 years.  I well recall how this 
lady used her authority to castigate a hapless official of the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs who had dared to present herself as an ‘observer’ at the Biodiversity Country Study 
Workshop in 1994, thus breaking the unwritten rule that this event was for members only.  Yet 
such acts of public and deliberate exclusion are not common enough to define a hierarchy of power 
within the policy community, so it tends to have the same headless character as many of PNG’s 
traditional political communities. 
 
My choice for Queen of Green could exercise her leadership in a rather different way, by tightening 
that porous segment of the national boundary through which the foreign scientists come and go.  I 
suspect that she would nominate Jared Diamond as the leading light amongst the scientific 
conservationists or conservation scientists who regularly cross this boundary, and in so doing, grant 
him a sort of honorary membership of the national policy community, for I know that she is a great 
fan of his work, especially his book-length answer to Yali’s question (Diamond 1998).  The key to 
this enthusiasm lies partly in the duration, form and substance of his engagement with the national 
policy process, but also the manner in which he represents the country in the global conservation 
policy domain.  If other members agreed with this judgement, we might at least have a way of 
ranking the membership claims of the foreign legion of biologists, whatever their own views about 
Diamond’s scientific credibility.  Yet anthropologists and other social scientists would no doubt 
want to be admitted by another door, and that makes me wonder whether any of the community’s 
putative leaders have the key to it. 
 
One thing that we, as anthropologists, might want to ask is how rural villagers might ever be 
counted as members of a policy community if they do not write articles, attend key meetings, own 
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computers, or send emails to each other.  Even someone like Saem Majnep, PNG’s prototypical 
parataxonomist, who does write books about (his own) traditional ecological knowledge (Majnep 
and Bulmer 1977), could hardly be described as a policy wonk.  If anything, it might make more 
sense to say that people should only qualify as members of the conservation policy community if 
they know who he is.  Another person who fits this bill is Kiatik Batet, leader of the Didipa clan of 
Baitabag village in Madang Province, who died in January 2005.  Two months after his death, the 
weekend edition of a national newspaper carried a long obituary celebrating his role as creator of 
the Kau Wildlife Area and his long association with a variety of individuals and organisations in the 
conservation business (Post-Courier, 11 March 2005).  One of these organisations was the 
Christensen Research Institute, which hosted the Biodiversity Country Study Workshop in 1994, 
and workshop participants made a pilgrimage to the Kau Wildlife Area before the meeting started.  
We might therefore say that folk like Saem Majnep and Kiatik Batet belong to the conservation 
policy community as icons, rather than agents.  We might even say that Jared Diamond belongs to 
it in the same way, if not in both. 
 
Signs of Schism: SLONGOs versus BINGOs 
 
In March 2003, some members of the policy community began to receive a series of emails from a 
character known as the ‘Black Saucepan’, containing or attaching successive drafts of a virulent 
diatribe against three of the BINGOs running conservation projects in PNG – Conservation 
International, The Nature Conservancy, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature.  I guess that many of 
the recipients would already have been on the mailing list of the Grumbling Bush Spirit, but the 
Spirit and the Saucepan are two quite different characters.  When the diatribe had been finalised, its 
title was ‘Institutionalized Neocolonialism in International NGOs Operating in Papua New 
Guinea’, and the Saucepan was transformed into a group called ‘People Against Foreign NGO 
Neocolonialism’.  An American member of the policy community, who denies being a member of 
this group, then advised other members of the community that he had posted it to his website, 
where it still remains, with the subtitle ‘Unheard Rainforest Conservation Voices from Papua New 
Guinea’ (PAFNN 2003).   
 
This document, which I shall henceforth call the Populist Manifesto, represents the national policy 
process in terms of a simple split between two ways of ‘doing conservation’, one of which entails 
the subordination of the national policy community to a global managerial process, while the other 
offers the prospect of restoring its former autonomy as part of a wider strategy of national self-
reliance.  The basic argument is that the BINGOs entering the policy process in the ‘early 1990s’ 
soon discovered that the SLONGOs simply could not handle the amounts of money which the 
global funding agencies were now prepared to spend on PNG, so they hired former bureaucrats 
and would-be politicians to act as window dressing for their national operations, paid them more 
than any SLONGO could afford, and by so doing, blocked the further development of ‘a truly 
indigenous conservation movement’.  Even where additional funds were made available to the 
SLONGOs, the result was much the same, because the smell of external funding ‘attracts people 
who are interested more in money than in sacrifice’. 
 
When local NGOs have to write plans and proposals in response to the rules of outside donors, 
suddenly their activities are driven more by what they think will be funded and less by what they 
once saw as the problems that created their need for working within an organisational framework. 
According to this argument, a ‘truly indigenous conservation movement’ would be founded on the 
voluntaristic spirit which animated the original creation of NGOs in the countries of the North. 
At this point, however, the Populist Manifesto displays an ambivalence which might be a sign of its 
multiple authorship.  Parts of the document are presented in the form of an appeal to the donors to 
stop throwing large amounts of money at the BINGOs. 
 
The real power to change this horrible mess in Papua New Guinea doesn’t lie in the hands of the 
big boys of conservation but in the hands of the donors.  The donors could fess up and face up to 
what’s going on.  If it struck their fancy, they could learn to become very critical and analytical of 
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what the international conservation NGOs are doing in PNG, and the subtle but far reaching 
collateral damage that they’re causing to the long term development of indigenous conservation 
NGOs whenever they fund the idiocy that is now being supported. 
 
In that case, should they simply take their money somewhere else, or could they fund a local social 
movement without corrupting it?  The main body of the manifesto yields only one example of a 
positive conservation outcome achieved by a local organisation supported by a donor agency, and 
that is the success of the Bismarck-Ramu Group in helping local communities to resist The Nature 
Conservancy’s proposal to develop a ‘sustainable logging project’ in the middle of Madang 
Province.  The irony of this particular case is that the Bismarck-Ramu Group ‘had begun as a 
project funded by UNDP’, yet the authors of the manifesto are otherwise inclined to ignore the fact 
that this ‘project’ was actually part of the Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management 
Program.  Instead, they condemn the UNDP for going on to engineer another Global 
Environment Facility grant to Conservation International for the Milne Bay Community-Based 
Coastal and Marine Conservation Project, and they ignore the national ‘small grants programme’ 
that is actually funded from the same source. 
 
To anyone familiar with the process by which these small grants are actually allocated, there is a 
certain irony in the manifesto’s call for donors to apply much stricter rules of accountability to 
‘community projects’ than they currently apply to the ‘national frontmen’ employed by the ‘big 
boys’ of the global conservation movement.  The assumption here is that international development 
agencies and charitable American foundations can and should enter into direct and long-lasting 
relationships with community-based organisations that would somehow differ from the ‘neo-
colonial’ relationships imposed by the BINGOs.  However, since AusAID’s Community 
Development Scheme is chastised for removing the incentive for communities to help themselves, 
it is not entirely clear how the funding of community-based organisations will achieve a better 
outcome. 
 
The manifesto’s alternative line of argument is that the donors are themselves complicit in a 
process which sends their own money ‘back to the originating country through hiring of overseas 
advisers, transfer pricing, and purchase of foreign supplies and equipment’, or do not care whether 
their bucks get a real bang on the ground, because ‘[t]hey just need to get rid of their money in a 
way that makes them feel good, and doesn’t later cause embarrassment’.   
 
TNC, CI, and WWF, driven by outside pressure either of their own making or from timetables set 
by overseas donors, passively toe the line, draw lines on maps and point to protected forests that 
are superficially protected at best and sometimes complete illusions.  Their efforts should be praised 
in that they seem to have hoodwinked the donors completely.  Either that or the donors simply 
don’t care.  Pardon the observation, but it seems that the big donors are primarily concerned with 
finding a money burner that won’t put out a stink.  The big boy conservation groups haven’t 
learned to stop the stink, but to the donor’s delight, they have learned to use a variety of odor 
masking perfumes.  
 
By this line of argument, the acts of corruption and resistance which follow from the allocation of 
vast sums to the conservation of biodiversity pose a political risk for both the donor and the 
recipient, and the best form of insurance against this risk, from their point of view, is to spend the 
money on the production of ‘lofty plans and pretty maps’ which do not entail any substantial 
engagement with local communities nor any actual transformation of local landscapes.   
Greenpeace is the only BINGO which gets a seal of approval for its work in PNG, the reason 
being that it is the only one which ‘has ever tried to put most of its resources into education 
programmes that can counteract the pillage of forest and marine resources by foreign interests’.  
This is not a reference to the school curriculum, but to the business of advocating public policy 
positions that deal with what the manifesto calls ‘bottom line issues’, like the rape and pillage 
perpetrated by the large-scale logging industry (see Greenpeace 2002).  This is presented as a far 
more productive way of spending foreign money than the business of implementing ‘community 
conservation projects that degenerate into cargo projects’.  On the other hand, the authors show 
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little faith in the capacity of public or community opinion to hold the Government accountable for 
its own behaviour or influence the formulation of its policies.  Instead, the Secretary for 
Environment and Conservation gets another rap on the knuckles for his grubby deals with the 
logging fraternity, his department is represented as one of the main recruiting grounds for the 
corrupt and mercenary staff employed by the BINGOs, and these same organisations are held 
responsible for the conservation policies posted to the website of the PNG embassy in 
Washington. 
 
If the Government, the BINGOs and the foreign donors are all polluted by their mutual 
relationship, one might expect a populist manifesto to praise the cleansing potential of indigenous 
knowledge and traditional cultural values or assert the need to defend these things against the 
corrupting influence of the conservation dollar (Chapin 2004).  Yet the document contains one 
fascinating passage that conveys a very different impression: 
Once upon a time in the not too distant past an international NGO decided to do nature 
conservation in the Wasi river basin.  This was [an] understandable idea.  The place was the 
environmentalist’s dream.  Lots and lots of bush filled with a multitude of flying and biting things.  
A diverse bunch of unwashed and scabrous savages leading traditional lives that they punctuated 
with stories and wars to give it some meaning.  No industry, no logging or mining, just a virginal 
tract of scrub…  One must ask why the Wasis have not stuffed the place up themselves?  Are they, 
as some of our NGO friends suspected, the possessors of native wisdom that has allowed them to 
live in harmony with nature for an interminably long time?  Unfortunately not…  The distressing 
fact is the Wasis would have destroyed the place were it not for the malaria and other parasites that 
kill most of their kids, sap their energy and make them mad.  In essence, their population has not 
been able to get to the level where it can push the resources to the point of scarcity…  The best 
thing the international NGO … could do would be to simply leave the Wasis alone while doing 
what they could to deter the nastier industries from entering the region…  IF they could bring 
health, education and awareness to the villages, only then would there be a need to talk 
conservation. 
 
It is one thing to say that indigenous communities have no obvious interest in donor-funded 
‘projects’ that aim to secure their collaboration in the creation and maintenance of a protected area, 
but it is normally the BINGOs that stand accused of representing these communities as an actual or 
potential ‘threat’ to their natural environment (West 2001).  If some of PNG’s indigenous 
communities are ‘sick societies’ (Edgerton 1992), one might well wonder how long it would take for 
an ‘indigenous conservation movement’ to take root in such soil, even if the BINGOs were not in 
the business of managing or corrupting the national policy process.  More interesting still, the 
author of this passage asks why the benighted members of the Wasi community ‘were unable to 
smelt steel, ponder nuclear physics and destroy the place like we did’ (my emphasis).  So ‘we’ may 
not just be reading a national and nationalist response to a specific form of foreign domination, but 
a text that betrays a more complex set of personal, institutional and ideological relationships within 
the conservation policy community.   
 
If the Bismarck-Ramu Group represents a truly indigenous conservation movement, it also has 
several foreign fans, including the European fans who have been funding it (Anderson 2005).  On 
the other hand, one also encounters the odd foreigner endeavouring to revive a SLONGO that 
might otherwise become extinct in all but name.  Not so long ago, I got a copy of an email from 
one hapless Australian volunteer who had just joined such an organisation, only to find that 
there’s no money to pay me to do the job I came to do, which is ecotourism development.  Instead 
of hanging around on the beach (which does have a certain appeal), I am going to launch into some 
serious proposal writing so that we can keep the organisation on the road….. [But] the internet and 
email connections are absolutely woeful here.  12 kbps on a good day, and even then the 
microwaves disappear into the ether regularly and the connection drops out.  You can imagine how 
long it takes to do searches and download information.  I have compiled a long list of granting 
organisations but getting the contact information and details on applications is proving to be at the 
edge of my tolerance.  
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This is a reality check.  From my reading of Iko-Forestri Nius, I estimate that there are roughly 20 
SLONGOs in the conservation policy community, but at any one moment in time, half of them are 
likely to be in a state of organisational and financial crisis that may prove terminal.  The total 
number of people gainfully employed by these organisations fluctuates with the level of foreign 
donor support, but would rarely exceed the 50 funded positions in the Milne Bay Community-
Based Coastal and Marine Conservation Project.  This small and motley crew does not count as the 
core of an indigenous social movement in any meaningful sense of the term, nor are they treated as 
such by the Populist Manifesto. 
 
Aside from the Milne Bay project, whose 50 jobs are essentially funded by the Global Environment 
Facility, the five BINGOs in PNG presently employ about 100 people with money derived from 
other foreign sources (Paul Chatterton, personal communication, August 2005).  However, with the 
exception of Conservation International, the BINGOs have also been suffering the effects of 
‘donor fatigue’, because this number has been falling over the past couple of years.  The financial 
afflictions of the conservation policy community have now been exaggerated by the collapse of the 
Forestry and Conservation Project, because this means that the Mama Graun Trust Fund will be 
deprived of the US$17 million grant that it would otherwise have received from the Global 
Environment Facility (Filer 2004b).  A cynic might therefore say that the grievances aired by the 
Populist Manifesto were just a function of the growing scarcity of money, but this is not the way in 
which it was interpreted by most other members of the policy community. 
 
Despite the annoyance and embarrassment caused to the managers of the three main targets, there 
was widespread agreement that the manifesto did point to some significant political issues in the 
practice of conservation and development.  In my view, these are best reflected in its own internal 
contradictions.  However, we should be wary of treating it as a portrait of the actual structure of the 
conservation policy community, let alone as evidence of a deepening rift between two well-defined 
camps or factions which have the capacity to form separate communities of their own.  For one 
thing, the functional and political differences amongst the five BINGOs are as great as those 
amongst the 20 SLONGOs.  But more importantly, when we actually try to map out the 
organisational structure of the policy community, even in its ‘non-governmental’ form, it is hard to 
maintain the illusion of a simple duality. 
 
Perhaps the Europeans are to blame for this.  The Populist Manifesto has a particular gripe against 
‘conservation projects’ funded and implemented by people and bodies represented as the agents of 
American imperial hegemony.  The Milne Bay Conservation Project fits this bill quite nicely if we 
choose to the regard the Global Environment Facility, as well as Conservation International, as one 
such body.  But if the funding and staffing of this project has served to distort the shape of the 
national policy community, the same could be said of a range of institutions and activities 
supported by the European Union’s ‘Eco-Forestry Programme’, which should by now include the 
publication of Iko-Forestri Nius.  The foreign consultants directly employed by this program are 
hosted by the PNG Forest Authority, which some members of the conservation policy community 
would regard as a den of iniquity, but they work in partnership with a non-profit company called 
FORCERT, whose shareholders include two BINGOs (WWF and Greenpeace) and four 
SLONGOs.  This company is managed by a European who used to run another project funded by 
the European Union, and its aim in life is to secure Forest Stewardship Council certification for the 
operators of small portable sawmills who are scattered around the country.  Two of the four 
SLONGOs have a long history of engagement with this ‘sub-sector’, and one of them provides a 
marketing service to yet another SLONGO, the Madang Forest Resource Owners Association, 
which is essentially a provincial association of ‘eco-foresters’, but tends to turn up as one of the 
signatories to petitions organised by The Eco-Forestry Forum. 
 
The European Union has not been the sole channel for European financial support to PNG’s eco-
foresters over the last decade, because some of these subsidies have come from the same Dutch 
and German charities which have supported the work of the Bismarck-Ramu Group.  But the 
Bismarck-Ramu Group is certainly not a group of eco-foresters, and the Populist Manifesto says 
nothing at all about the social structure of PNG’s eco-forestry sector, despite the fact that it now 
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constitutes a significant sectoral grouping within the conservation policy community.  If the 
distribution of foreign funds has opened up a split within the policy community, one could just as 
well argue that this is a split between people who work in or on different types of ecosystem as a 
split between people whose work is funded by different colours of foreign money. 
 
Conclusion: The Problem of Closure 
 
Let me imagine for a moment that I have been given the task of designing a test for membership of 
PNG’s conservation policy community that will accord with my own gut feelings about who really 
does belong to it.  What set of questions would best serve to decide which applicants should be 
admitted to the club?  I suspect that three questions would be sufficient for this purpose: 
Have you lived and worked in PNG for at least X years? 
Who is the present Secretary for Environment and Conservation, and should he be admitted to the 
club? 
Who or what is Y or Z (where Y or Z stands for an iconic person or place whose significance 
would only be recognised by a genuine member)? 
 
The first question is meant to prevent a horde of foreign scientists, consultants, managers or 
advisers from dominating the community in a manner that would justify the nationalist outrage of a 
Black Saucepan.  The number of years specified by this residence rule could be the eight years 
which a foreigner must continuously spend in PNG before he or she can apply for citizenship.  
Alternatively, it could be the total number of years which Jared Diamond has spent in the country 
since he made his first visit in the 1960s, so he at least would qualify for membership.  Since I do 
not know this number, I would settle on five years as a reasonable compromise, and if Jared 
Diamond fails to meet this criterion, he will have to settle for honorary membership as an ancient 
icon.  A five-year residence rule would disqualify most of the foreign scientists whose only visits 
have been made for the purpose of conducting fieldwork, and that makes sense, because fieldwork 
does not entail much personal interaction with other resident members of the policy community.  It 
would also disqualify most of the foreigners whose engagement with the national policy process has 
been an effect of their employment by a foreign government, charitable foundation, or multilateral 
institution.  Of the people previously mentioned as contributors or recipients in the email exchange 
concerning the passage of amendments to the Forestry Act in August 2005, the World Bank staff 
member is the only one who would not count as a member of the club.  Another who would not 
count is the official who occupies the ‘PNG desk’ in the Australian Department of Environment 
and Heritage, and he has told me that this is only right and proper.   
 
The second question serves two purposes.  There are some foreigners who might qualify by the 
five-year residence rule, but have not been in the country for many years and are no longer in touch 
with the conservation policy process.  If the test does not allow them the use of a search engine, 
they might well prove to be ignorant of the Secretary’s identity.  But even those citizens and aliens 
who have this knowledge could be caught out by a preference ranking that enables them to say that 
they neither ‘strongly agree’ nor ‘strongly disagree’ with the idea of letting him into the club.  Such 
indifference would merit automatic exclusion, but the Secretary himself would gain admission 
unless he also proved to be indifferent to the idea of his own membership. 
A third question is required because there are many Papua New Guineans who know the 
Secretary’s identity, and might have strong feelings about his personal or political merits, without 
having any specific interest in the conservation policy process.  There are also people like the 
Executive Officer of the Forest Industries Association, an expatriate who would qualify by the five-
year residence rule and probably have the ‘right’ answers to the second question, but who would 
evidently have to be disqualified if the policy community were to retain some semblance of political 
integrity.  We therefore need to test each candidate’s possession of some esoteric knowledge that 
will function like a Freemason’s secret handshake, and change the test from time to time in case the 
secret leaks out of the club.  It could be a question about Saem Majnep, Jared Diamond, Motupore 
Island, or Peckover Haus, but if it were a multiple choice question, like “Which of the following 
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does not count as an icon or sacred site for the conservation policy community?”, most true 
members should be able to pass the test. 
 
How many people would presently count as members of the club by such criteria?  If I am right in 
my estimation that roughly 200 of the country’s residents are currently working for BINGOs and 
SLONGOs in the conservation business, I guess that more than half of them would fail to qualify 
because they are not being paid to think about policy issues, or are too new to the business, or have 
only recently arrived from overseas – like the hapless Australian volunteer who had just discovered 
that she was not being paid at all.  On the other hand, my assertion that NGOs now form the core 
of the policy community does not necessarily mean that their employees form a majority of its 
individual members.  Once we count the bureaucrats, consultants, scientists, journalists, educators, 
and other enthusiasts, including people who have occupied a number of different roles at different 
times, and those (like me) who are no longer living in PNG, we could well end up with a 
membership of 300 or so.   
 
In order to prove that the appearance of a club this size is not just a creature of my own fevered 
imagination, I would need to show that each member knows a certain proportion of the other 
members, and that the form and substance of their mutual interaction makes for the kind of social 
integration that turns a network into a community.  I could make a better case for this assertion if I 
had access to the hard drives or address books of the other members who are known to me, but I 
am rather glad I don’t, because mathematical models of network closure are way beyond my 
competence.  So my case will have to rest on a record of specific texts, broadcasts, gatherings and 
conversations – the kind of ‘ethnographic’ record which I have attempted in this paper.  And if the 
case is made, the question then is what explains the element of closure that defines this policy 
community. 
 
The first answer would pinpoint the existence of a common and exclusive interest in the national 
policy domain.  The Populist Manifesto repudiates this answer, but it also denies the existence of a 
single policy community and distorts what I would regard as some of its structural features.  
Perhaps it would be better to represent this semi-structured space (at least in two dimensions) as a 
Venn diagram with a number of overlapping circles containing specific areas of common interest, 
like the protection of coral reefs, the promotion of eco-forestry, or the battle against ‘eco-
imperialism’.  The manifesto could then be read as a sign of unity, not a sign of division, if it spread 
through several parts of this space but still rebounded off the outer margin and then vanished into a 
central black hole.  But even if one could show that this had been its actual trajectory, it would still 
only serve to define the community in a formal, not a substantive, sense. 
 
The authors of the Populist Manifesto would no doubt say that most of the people whom I regard 
as members of the national policy community are merely the local agents of a global policy regime, 
and if there has ever been ‘a truly indigenous conservation movement’ in PNG, its membership 
would be invisible to the rest of us.  Expatriates could well account for half the membership, as I 
have chosen to define it, but from my knowledge of their actions and communications, I would say 
that most of these ‘aliens’ owe more allegiance to the policy community itself, or their alliances 
within it, than they do to any foreign funding agency. 
 
It would be foolish to deny that the shape and size of the community has been heavily influenced 
by the river of money flowing under the bridge of the Biodiversity Convention, especially that 
which has flowed out of the Global Environment Facility (see Vogler and Jordan 2003).  But we 
should not forget that this has funded the ‘local resistance’ of the Bismarck-Ramu Group, as well as 
the ‘foreign domination’ of the Milne Bay Conservation Project.  While the Populist Manifesto 
represents the ‘national’ policy process and community as the site of a struggle between global 
structures and local agency, it also contains a sub-text in which the question of national identity is 
being negotiated between the claimants to a place in this intermediate zone.  Local, national and 
global forces are all represented in this arena, in the sense that people talk and write about them, 
but what people say, both in public and in private, is not just a function of where they stand in an 
objective hierarchy of political scales.  Nor does this conception of a political and institutional 
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hierarchy serve to explain the social integration of the policy community to which the manifesto is 
addressed. 
 
Should we therefore say that the social integration of the policy community has been a function of 
its relatively stable membership and relatively common values, and then cite the Populist Manifesto 
as evidence of the sort of controversy which might be turning it back into a loosely associated 
network of interest groups (Coleman and Perl 1999)?  One answer to this question would be to say 
that the community is stable because the members are unable to achieve their policy goals.  In other 
words, the river of foreign funding flows into a stagnant lake behind a dam, and that is where we 
swim around.  The figurative dam would be the legal institutions of customary land tenure, the 
social disorganisation of customary landowners, and the ‘ideology of landownership’ which inspires 
the form of national populism espoused by the Populist Manifesto (Filer 1997).  While customary 
landowners are not organised, and cannot be organised, in a way that would enable them to penetrate 
the boundaries of a national policy community, the people on the inside, including the protagonists 
of an ‘indigenous conservation movement’, are united by their common feelings of frustration in 
the face of this immovable force.   
 
While this might help to explain the denigration of the Wasi ‘community’ by one (apparently 
foreign) author of the Populist Manifesto, it does not sit so well with the general tenor of the 
document, especially its celebration of the Bismarck-Ramu Group’s alliance with other customary 
landowners to defeat the evil designs of The Nature Conservancy.  Then again, the fact that these 
were designs for a ‘sustainable logging project’ alerts us to a slightly different explanation for the 
element of closure in construction of the policy community.  This would say that the conservation 
policy community is locked into a position in the national forest policy process where the balance 
of power between the World Bank, the Government, the logging industry and the ‘customary 
landowner’ amounts to a stalemate (Filer 1998).  It is hard to fathom the power play practiced 
between the World Bank and ‘civil society’ in their surreptitious alliance against the logging industry 
and its political allies, even when this is subject to close ethnographic scrutiny (Filer 2000).  If the 
cancellation of the Forestry and Conservation Project means that the World Bank has now got out 
of the forest policy swamp which it entered 15 years ago, some – though perhaps not all – sections 
of the conservation policy community may still be stuck in the middle of it.  From this point of 
view, the significance of the Milne Bay Conservation Project may not lie with the strings which 
connect it to alien powers in New York and Washington, but with the fact that it is not a forest 
conservation project.  In other words, the bank’s departure may be one factor in a current tendency 
for the community to segment along sectoral, rather than ideological, lines. 
 
This finally brings us to the awkward question of ‘culture’, but that in turn can be framed as two 
rather different questions.  On the one hand, we can follow Coleman and Perl (1999) by asking 
whether members of the conservation policy community share a set of ‘beliefs, values and norms’ 
which sets them apart from other policy communities or networks operating in the same 
jurisdiction or at the same level of political organisation.  On the other hand, we can ask whether 
the relative closure of this and other policy communities reflects some generic feature of a national 
(Papua New Guinean) or regional (Melanesian) political culture. 
The first question need not detain us very long.  I have already suggested that certain kinds of 
knowledge – whether of people, places or events – serve to define the limits of community 
membership, but I would not count these as a set of ‘beliefs, values and norms’.  It makes more 
sense to distinguish the corporate cultures of a pair of BINGOs like Conservation International and 
the Worldwide Fund for Nature, mainly because of the way in which they have developed their 
own ‘policy narratives’ about the conservation business (Jeanrenaud 2002).  If we lump these 
together with the policy narrative contained in the Populist Manifesto, we simply end up with a 
dog’s breakfast. 
 
In answer to the second question, we might point out that this manifesto represents a 
communitarian ideology that is deeply embedded in the national political culture and grounded in a 
strident defence of customary land and landowners against the real or imaginary threats posed by 
the agents of capitalism, globalisation, and ‘development’.  But since this only puts the BINGOs in 
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the same box as the logging, fishing and mining companies that threaten the biodiversity values 
which the BINGOs aim to conserve, it certainly will not serve to explain the closure of the 
conservation policy community.  What it might help to explain is the evidence that foreign funding 
agencies in the conservation business are alternately attracted by PNG’s biodiversity values and 
repelled (or should I say ‘resisted’?) by its political culture.  Members of the national policy 
community might then be united by a sort of immunity to this magnetic alternation of enthusiasm 
and fatigue, and if we observe a similar phenomenon in the mining sector, where foreign investors 
are periodically attracted by another kind of value, we could argue that all national policy 
communities are formed out of the ‘middle ground’ between the hesitant foreign investor and the 
recalcitrant customary landowner. 
 
Another way of answering the second question is to suggest that the Melanesian State is populated 
by policy communities and bureaucratic communities which behave like traditional political 
communities.  The reason for this would be that most of their national members are themselves 
customary landowners who retain strong personal ties to their own traditional political communities 
and somehow manage to infect the foreign members with a distinctive form of parochial loyalty.  
This argument has an understandable appeal to anthropologists like myself (see Filer 1998).  One 
might go on to argue that Melanesian policy communities will tend to segment when they have 
reached a certain size, in the same way that Forge explained the statelessness of traditional 
Melanesian society in terms of the cultural and ecological limits to the scale of social cooperation 
(Forge 1972).  In that case, the Populist Manifesto could be read as evidence that the conservation 
policy community has now grown too big for a pair of Melanesian political boots, that its 
component clans or factions are thus about to go their separate ways, and if they have not done so 
yet, that is because the community does not have the institutional capacity to ‘absorb’ any more 
foreign money.   
 
Sounds nice – but will it wash?  A sceptic could argue that PNG’s conservation policy community 
shows signs of social closure because PNG is a relatively small country, and whatever its level of 
biological and cultural diversity, the number of people with a mutually accepted common interest in 
conservation policy goals will be small enough for them to get to know each other fairly well and 
establish a single set of institutions through which they can interact.  This is an ecological 
explanation of closure, but not a cultural one, and it ought to apply with even greater force to the 
small island states of the Pacific region, regardless of their cultural heritage or the institutions of 
customary resource ownership.  If we take this line of argument, we might pay more attention to 
international variations in the ‘modern’ institutional landscape wherein policy communities are 
formed and reproduced.  For example, the absence of state-sponsored NGOs, of the kind found in 
some of the countries of Southeast Asia, is a feature of PNG’s institutional landscape that may 
reflect the relative weakness of state institutions, but hardly counts as a feature of its national 
political culture unless we can tie the weakness of ‘modern’ state institutions to the strength of 
‘traditional’ political communities.  A resolution of these issues must await the more detailed and 
comparative ethnographic study of conservation (and other) policy communities across the region 
and the world. 
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